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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Judges Greenwood and Thome 
FROM: Judge Bench 
DATE: November 17,2009 
RE: Soderborg v. Soderborg, Case No. 20080398 
This case is scheduled for conferencing on Tuesday November 24,2009. I have attached a 
preliminary draft to help with our discussion. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Barbara Soderborg, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
David S. Soderborg, 
Respondent and Appellee 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20080398-CA 
F 
2009 
I L E D 
0 
UT App XXX { 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 064901622 
The Honorable Robert P. Faust 
Attorneys; Grant W.P. Morrison and Matthew G. Morrison, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Kim M. Luhn and Paul H. Liapis, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Thorne. 
BENCH, Judge: 
Barbara Soderborg (Wife) appeals the trial court's order 
denying her alimony, attorney fees, and a share of David S. 
Soderborg's (Husband) separate, nonmarital property in the 
parties' divorce action. Wife also challenges some of the 
court's factual findings relating to that order.1 We affirm. 
1. To the extent Wife challenges the trial court's findings 
concerning Husband's income and whether the subject properties 
were received as a gift or inheritance, we conclude that Wife has 
failed to meet her marshaling burden. See Utah R. App. P. 
24(a) (9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal 
all record evidence that supports the challenged finding."); West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (explaining marshaling requirement). 
Wife clai ms that the trial court abused its discretion by 
failing to award her a share of the appreciated value of 
Husband's separate, nonmarital property. See Jensen v. Jensen, 
2009 UT App 1, f 6, 203 P.3d 1020 ("A trial court has 
considerable discretion concerning property division in a divorce 
proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). "[A] spouse's separate 
property and/or its appreciation, may be awarded in whole or in 
part to the other spouse . . . where the nonowner spouse has 
'contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or protection of 
that property,' or [if] there are 'other extraordinary situations 
where equity so demands.'" Id. f 11 (quoting Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)).2 " TAlctive 
participation and contribution" is required for a nonowner spouse 
to receive separate, nonmarital property under the contribution 
category. Id. |^ 14 (emphasis added) . 
Here, Husband either inherited or was gifted two properties 
from his father. When Husband received them, the properties were 
in violation of building codes and zoning ordinances and were 
facing condemnation due to their severe states of disrepair. For 
2. Separate, nonmarital property may also be awarded to the 
nonowner spouse if "the property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through commingling," where the nonowner spouse is 
granted an interest in the property, or in lieu of alimony or 
attorney fees. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 
1988). Wife makes no such arguments on appeal. 
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several years, Husband dedicated most of his time to repairing 
these properties, transforming them from nearly-condemned "dumps" 
to habitable, profitable rental properties. Once the properties 
could be used as rentals, Husband then dedicated most of his time 
to operating and managing the rental properties. 
Wife argues that Husband's labor, which transformed these 
properties into profitable rental properties, is a marital asset, 
thereby entitling her to a portion of the properties' appreciated 
value. However, Wife has not presented any evidence showing how 
she directly "contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or 
protection" of the properties, save a half-day of painting. See 
id. f 11. In fact, the evidence shows that the properties were 
improved through Husband's labors alone. As Wife has failed to 
show that she had any "active participation [with] or 
contribution" to the properties, we conclude that she cannot 
claim a portion of their value under the contribution theory for 
granting separate, nonmarital property to the nonowner spouse. 
See id. % 14. Further, Wife has not adequately demonstrated that 
this case presents an extraordinary situation where equity 
demands division of Husband's separate, nonmarital property. See 
icL. H 11. 
Wife next claims that the trial court made several erroneous 
factual findings in support of its decision to deny her alimony. 
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See Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT App 282, % 7, 76 P.3d 716 ("If [an 
appellate court] is charged with the task of reviewing the trial 
court's findings of fact [in support of an alimony determination] 
we will reverse only if the findings are clearly erroneous." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Wife argues that the trial 
court should have awarded her alimony because she became disabled 
following cancer treatment and cannot support herself by becoming 
employed and producing her own income, save the $14 7 0 monthly 
disability payment she receives from a private insurer.3 See 
generally Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (a) (ii) (requiring trial 
courts to consider "the recipient[ spouse's] earning capacity or 
ability to produce income" in determining alimony). At trial, 
the only evidence Wife presented to prove her disability was her 
own testimony and her monthly receipt of a disability check from 
a private insurer. Indeed, after testifying that her doctor had 
not released her to work, Wife admitted on cross-examination that 
she had not requested work release. The trial court therefore 
3. Concerning her ability to produce income, Wife argues that 
her disability payments are her only source of income and any 
assertion that she makes a substantial income from breeding dogs 
is not supported by the evidence. We decline to address this 
argument, however, because the trial court did not include any 
profits Wife may have made from her dog breeding hobby in 
calculating her yearly income. In fact, the court calculated 
Wife's yearly income from her disability insurance "without 
consideration of any additional income she may derive from her 
dogs, the sale of puppies, or other ventures that she was engaged 
in during the marriage." (Emphasis added.) Nor did the court 
use any of Wife's profits from dog breeding as a basis for 
imputing income. Rather, it appears that any evidence concerning 
Wife's dog breeding hobby was used only to show that Wife had the 
physical ability to work. 
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found Wife had failed to prove she could not become employed in 
order to earn income and contribute to her own support, reasoning 
that Wife had not presented any testimony from a medical doctor 
that she could not work due to a disability. 
The trial court also found that Husband did not have the 
ability to pay alimony to Wife. See generally id. § 30-3-
5(8) (a) (iii) (requiring trial courts to consider "the ability of 
the payor spouse to provide support" in determining alimony). 
Husband had been ordered to pay temporary alimony to Wife, and 
the trial court found that Husband needed to work a second job to 
meet this obligation. The record also shows that Husband and 
Wife were living beyond their means, both claiming expenses well 
beyond their monthly incomes.4 Although these facts illustrate 
that both parties need alimony to maintain their respective 
lifestyles, see generally id. § 30-3-5(8)(a)(i) (requiring trial 
courts to consider "the financial condition and needs of the 
recipient spouse" in determining alimony), these facts also 
illustrate that neither party is able to pay alimony to the 
other. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court's 
findings were clearly erroneous. See Davis, 2003 UT App 282, 
f 7. 
4. Wife claimed a monthly income of $1470 with expenses totaling 
around $3500 while Husband claimed a monthly income of $1932 with 
monthly expenses of $2 579, not including the temporary alimony 
obligation. 
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Finally, Wife claims that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying her attorney fees. See Stonehocker v. 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, % 10, 176 P.3d 476 ("[T]he decision 
to award attorney fees . . . [is] within the trial court's sound 
discretion." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The trial 
court ordered that both parties pay their own attorney fees, 
finding that neither party had the ability to pay for the other. 
See id. ("[T]he trial court's . . . denial of attorney fees must 
be based on evidence of the financial need of the receiving 
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees." (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). In light of the facts concerning the parties' monthly 
incomes and expenses, the trial court's decision to deny Wife 
attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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